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Abstract. Wormhole attack is a serious security issue in Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET)
where malicious nodes may distort the network topology and obtain valuable information. Many
solutions, based on round trip time, packet traversal time, or hop-count, have been proposed to
detect wormholes. However, these solutions were only partially successful in dealing with node high-
speed mobility, variable tunnel lengths, and fake information by malicious nodes. To address those
issues, this paper proposes a novel multi-level authentication (MLA) model and protocol (MLAMAN)
for detecting and preventing wormhole attacks reliably. MLAMAN allows all intermediate nodes to
authenticate control packets on a hop-by-hop basis and at three levels: 1) the packet level where
the integrity of the packets can be verified, 2) the node membership level where a public key holder-
member can be certified, and 3) the neighborhood level where the neighborhood relationship between
nodes can be determined. The novelty of the model is that it prevents malicious nodes from joining the
network under false information and pretense. It detects wormhole nodes effectively under various
scenarios including variable tunnel lengths and speeds of moving nodes. The effectiveness of our
approach is confirmed by simulation results through various scenarios.
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1. Introduction
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET [5]) is a collection of wireless mobile nodes without
network infrastructures, routers or access points. The topology of the network can change
unpredictably and frequently because of nodes joining or leaving. In a MANET, nodes
communicate with neighbors to discover and maintain routes to their destinations. Data
transfer from a source node to a destination node can be routed through intermediate nodes,
which act both as hosts or routers. A network routing protocol in a MANET specifies how
nodes in the network communicate with one another. It enables a node to discover and
maintain the routes as needed between itself and other nodes. Many routing protocols have
been developed for MANETs [3]; among them, Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
[21] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [10] are the most important protocols. Because of
the ad hoc nature, Denial of service (DoS) is a serious issue in MANET. DoS attacks aim to
deny a user of a service or a resource he/she would normally expect to receive. Disrupting
the routing services at the network layer is an example of DoS [22] where a malicious node
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tries to deplete resources of other nodes. Other types of DoS include Blackhole [24], Sinkhole
[19], Grayhole [4], Flooding [25] , Whirlwind [20], and Wormhole [12].
The wormhole attacks in Ad hoc Networks are described in [9][12][14] cite where the
authors categorize several types of packet tunneling wormhole attacks , including worm-
hole through the tunnel (called out-of-band channel - OB), wormhole using encapsulation,
wormhole using packet relay, and wormhole with high power transmission. Such wormhole
attacks may operate in two modes: Hidden Mode (HM) and Participation Mode (PM). In
HM, malicious nodes are hidden from normal nodes, which on receiving a packet they simply
forward the packet without processing it. By doing so, the malicious nodes are invisible as
they never appear in the routing tables of their neighbors. In contrast, in PM, malicious
nodes are visible during the route discover process because they process control packets just
like other normal nodes. These malicious nodes appear in the routing tables of their neigh-
bors and the hop-count (HC) values increase when control packets are routed. This type
of attacks can easily be carried out with on-demand routing protocols, typically the AODV
routing protocol to eavesdrop information.
Previous researches on wormhole attacks mainly focus on detection algorithms that rely
on Geographical Location, Round Trip Time, Packet Traversal Time, Hop-Count informa-
tion, or Digital signatures. These algorithms, however, have many weaknesses: With geo-
graphical location based approaches such as LBK [15] or SeRLoc [16], nodes continuously
broadcast location data (GPS information) and all transmissions between node pairs are
encrypted. On the other hand, the TIK [6] solution rely on synchronization among all
nodes. These solutions thus incur high communication overhead. With time analysis based
approaches such as DelPHI [1], MHA [9], and TTHCA [12][13], a malicious node may col-
laborate with the route discovery process but deliberately provides fake information in the
control packets. With digital signature based approaches such as SAODV [18] which does
not have a key management mechanism, malicious nodes can pass over the security by using
fake keys. On the other hand, ARAN [23] supports key management, but it is not able to
detect wormhole node under HM mode (according to [8]). This paper proposed MLAMAN, a
new MANET wormhole detection model that comprises a multi-level authentication (MLA)
mechanism, an MLA-secured routing protocol, and a node membership certification proto-
col. The MLA mechanism uses digital signatures with the RSA [2] public key encryption
and SHA1 [11] hashing function. With MLA, all intermediate nodes can authenticate control
packets on a hop-by-hop basis and at three levels: 1) the packet level where the integrity of
the packets can be verified, 2) the node membership level where a public key holder-member
can be certified, and 3) the neighborhood level where the neighborhood relationship between
nodes can be determined. The MLAMAN protocol is a modified version of the AODV to
incorporate the MLA mechanism. The node membership certification protocol allows nodes
to participate in the routing procedure. It is demonstrated that the proposed solution is ef-
fective in wormhole detection under various network scenarios, and prevents malicious node
from taking part in the route discovery process with fake information.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 describes the proposed MLAMAN model for wormhole detection with multi-level
authentication (MLA) mechanism. The proposed MLAMAN protocol (MLA mechanisms
for Mobile Ad hoc Network) by integrating the MLA into the route discovery procedure of
AODV protocol. A public key management method and protocol to provide Membership
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Certification (MC) for a node before it can participate in the route discovery process. Section
4 presents the performance evaluation results by simulation using NS2 [7]. Finally, section
5 concludes the paper and provides a discussion on future work.
2. Related works
This section summarizes related work that focuses on location-based, time-based, and dig-
ital signature-based approaches in detecting and preventing wormhole attacks in MANETs.
On geographical location based approach. The authors in [15] described a graph theoretic
model to characterize the wormhole attack and prevent wormholes. They used a Local
Broadcast Key (LBK) method to install a secure Ad-hoc Network against wormhole at-
tacks. Two types of nodes are involved: guard nodes and regular nodes. The Guard nodes
continuously broadcast location data obtained from localization systems such as the Global
Positioning System (GPS) or SeRLoc [16]. Regular nodes calculate their location relative to
the guards’ beacons and by doing so they can detect abnormal resend transmission by the
wormhole attackers. All transmissions between node pairs are encrypted by the local broad-
cast key of the sending end and decrypted at the receiving end. This approach is suitable for
networks with fixed and static topology wireless sensor networks. For dynamic topologies,
the solution is not effective as its performance suffers badly due to large time delay variations
and communication overhead caused by continuous broadcast of location data.
On time analysis based approach. The authors in [6] described the TIK protocol for
detecting wormhole attacks. TIK uses Packet Leashes solution that appends timing infor-
mation to a packet to limit its admissible transmission distance. Thus, a wormhole attack is
detected when packets are delivered at a much shorter time than possible through expected
valid routes. TIK depends on a strict synchronization among all nodes. As synchronization
is difficult and resource-consuming, such detection method become less effectiveness in high-
speed mobile networks. The authors in [1] described the Delay Per Hop Indication (DelPHI)
solution for detecting wormhole attacks. The idea is to allow the source node to receive the
route reply packets on many routes and calculates the round trip time (RTT) per route. It
is assumed that a route with a small number of hops has a small RTT, so the route that
has a higher RTT per hop count than a pre-calculated threshold is considered a wormhole
route. However, in dynamic environments where the network loads are unpredictable and
nodes move rapidly, the RTTs are highly variable, the proposed solution becomes less reli-
able. The authors in [9] proposed the multi-hop count analysis (MHA) solution based on
hop counts. MHA does not require Round Trip Time (RTT) measurement. MHA modifies
the AODV route discovery protocol to identify several unique routes between the source
and the destination nodes. A route with a much lower HC value than other routes is then
assumed to include a wormhole and is avoided. The authors in [12] presented a wormhole
detection algorithm based on Traversal Time and Hop Count Analysis (TTHCA) for the
AODV routing protocol. TTHCA obtains the packet transversal time (PTT) by subtracting
the highly variable processing times of nodes along the route from the RTT and provides a
more reliable wormhole detection performance with low error rates, and small computational
costs. However, the TTHCA detection ability to malicious nodes is restricted because the
PTT of packet is seriously affected by nodes moving at fast speeds. An improved TTHCA
to identify time measurement tampering in traversal time and hop count analysis wormhole
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detection algorithm, is described in [13].
On digital signature based approach. Many proposed solutions deployed cryptographic
techniques to protect routing packets and detect wormholes. The Secure AODV (SAODV)
[18] is proposed to prevent malicious nodes from fabricating the HC number and the Sequence
Number (SN) in route discovery packets. However, SAODV only supports end-to-end certi-
fication and not hop-by-hop, as a consequence, an intermediate node cannot certify packet
from its preceding node. In addition, because SAODV does not have a key management
mechanism for node, so malicious nodes can pass over security by using fake keys. The
authors in [23] proposed the Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) pro-
tocol for detecting and preventing attacks on insecure protocols. Different from SAODV,
route discovery packet (RDP) in ARAN is signed and certified at all hop-by-hop nodes.
ARAN supplements the public key management mechanism to provide authentication and
non-repudiation services. However, it is not able to detect wormhole node under HM mode.
Furthermore, ARAN assumes that there is no way to way to guarantee that one path is
shorter than another in terms of hop count. Accordingly, ARAN does not guarantee a short-
est path, but offers a quickest path which is chosen by the RDP that reaches the destination
first. That means that ARAN is unable to identify the routing costs through intermediate
relaying nodes.
3. MLAMAN - A Multi-Level Authentication Model for MANETs
This section describes our proposed Multi-Level Authentication model for mobile ad hoc
networks, MLAMAN consists of three components: a multi-level authentication mechanism
for detecting and preventing both PM and HM wormhole attacks, a modified AODV protocol
(MLAMAN routing protocol) for route discovery and route maintenance, and an auxiliary
node membership certification protocol. The following subsections describe the three ele-
ments of the MLA model.
3.1. The MLA mechanism
The MLA mechanism is designed to authenticate routing packets (RREQ or RREP) on a
hop-by-hop basis and at three levels: (1) Packet integrity level; (2) Node member certification
level; (3) and Neighborhood verification level. Table 1 defines symbols used in the paper.
Table 1. Description of symbols
Variable Descriptions
MCNδ Membership certificate of node Nδ
TMC Time interval for Ncenter checks PKDB to provide the MC
Nδ Node labeled Nδ
kNδ+, kNδ - Public and private keys of node Nδ
En(v, k) Encryption of value v using key k
De(v, k) Decryption of value v using key k
H(v) Hash value of v
IPNδ Address of node δ
PKDB Public key database in node Ncenter
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3.1.1. Packet integrity verification
The integrity verification process is designed to prevent a malicious node to tamper with
the control packet when it is relayed from hop to hop. Under the PM mode, malicious nodes
may deliberately alter the contents of the routing packets. The main idea is for a node (Ni)
to verify the integrity of the RREQ packet (or RREP) it receives from a source node or
an intermediate node Nj . The packet verification value is obtained as follows. First, the
sending node Nj uses H to hash all protected fields of the RREQ (or RREP) packet and then
encrypts the resulting hash value using its private key as shown in eqn 1. The encrypted
value is saved into the VC field of the packet (RREQ or REP) before broadcasting it to its
neighbor Ni.
P.V C = En(H(P.F ields {V C}), kNj−) (1)
Where P is RREQ or RREP packets.
Algorithm 1 shows steps that Ni verifies the integrity of the packet RREQ (or RREP)
on receiving from a source (or an intermediate) node Nj . Node Ni uses the public key kNj+
to decrypt the VC field value of packet (P.VC). Protected fields of the packet are hashed
by Ni using the H function. If the hask value val2 matches val1 the integrity of the packet
is verified, otherwise else the packet has been modified, and it can be concluded that the
preceding node (node Nj) is a PM wormhole node.
Algorithm 1 Checking the Packet Integrity at node Ni
Input: RREQ or RREP packet; kNj+ is the public key of Nj
Output: True if RREQ (or RREP) packet is integrity; else return False
1: function Boolean IsPacketIntegrity(Packet P ; Key kNj+)
2: Begin
3: val1 ← De(P.V C, kNj+);
4: val2 ← H(P.F ields\{V C});
5: Return (val1 == val2);
6: End
3.1.2. Node member authentication
As with other solutions that deployed cryptographic techniques, each node in the envi-
ronment has a private key and a public key. The proposed solution also assumes that for a
node to participate in the route discovery process it has to be certified and its certificate can
be verified by any other node with the proposed procedure. This node member authenti-
cation excludes malicious nodes from the routing process and overcomes the weakness from
SAODV. We use a reliable node named Ncenter to manage and provide the Membership Cer-
tification (MC) to all nodes using the MCP and MCACK packets. Section 3.3. will discuss
the procedure and the auxiliary protocol for this node membership certification.
Definition 1: Membership Certification is provided for all nodes automatically by the
Ncenter and it is added to the RREQ or RREP packet while node participates in the discovery
route process. MC of node Nδ is calculated by first encrypting the hash value of the member’s
node address (IPNδ) and public key (kNδ+) with the private key of the Ncenter and then
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encrypting the encrypted result of the first step with the private key of the member node Nδ
as shown in eqn 2.
MCNδ = En(En(H(IPNδ , kNδ+), kNcenter−), kNδ−) (2)
Algorithm 2 shows steps to verify MC when node Ni receives a RREQ (or RREP) packet
sent (or forwarded) by node Nδ. Node Ni decrypts the MC field of the packet (P.MC) using
the public key of node Nδ and then decrypts the resultant with the public key of node Ncenter.
If the value after decryption matches the hash value of Nδ node address then Nδ is a valid
member node. Otherwise, the packet is dropped because the membership of sending node
Nδ cannot be verified (either the node is unknown or has not been MCed by Ncenter). Note
that the member nodes authentication process is performed only when the integrity of the
packet RREQ (or RREP) has been verified.
Algorithm 2 Checking Members Node at Ni
Input: RREQ or RREP packet; kNδ+ is public key of Nδ
Output: True if Nδ is members; Else return False
1: function Boolean IsMembersNode(Packet P ; Key kNj+)
2: Begin
3: If Not IsPacketIntegrity(P, kNδ+) Then return False;
4: val1 ← De(De(P.MC, kNδ+), kNcenter+);
5: val2 ← H(IPNδ , kNδ+);
6: Return (val1 == val2);
7: End
3.1.3. Neighborhood relationship verification
The proposed neighborhood relationship determination allows a member node to detect
a route with wormhole node. When Ni receives RREQ (or RREP) packet from Nj , if both
of Ni and Nj nodes are not physically neighbors, a HM wormhole node must have operated
on the discovered route.
Definition 2: Two nodes (Ni and Nj) are geographic and physical neighbors of each
other if they are within their transmission radius. Explicitly, Ni and Nj are neighbors only if
d(Ni, Nj) 6 min(RNi , RNj ), where RNδ is maximum transmission radius of Nδ and d(Ni, Nj)
is Euclidean distance between Ni and Nj as given by eqn 3, and (xNδ , yNδ) is the location
coordinate of node Nδ.
d(Ni, Nj) =
√
(xNi − xNj )2 + (yNi − yNj )2 (3)
Example 1: In the network topology shown in Figure 1a), both of nodes N1 and N2
are neighbors in the physical sense because the distance between N1 and N2 is less than (or
equal to) the minimum transmission radius of the two nodes. In MANETs, the location of a
node changes due to its mobility nature. We adopt the use of GPS to obtain node location
as described in [14][15].
7





Distance (d) Transmission radius







Figure 1. Physical neighbor nodes
Example 2: In wormhole HM mode attack, malicious nodes are hidden from normal
nodes. As shown in Figure 1b), a wormhole node M, on receiving the RREQ (or RREP)
from N1, it will forward the packet to N2 without changing the packet. Hence, N2 can-
not detect the malicious node M with only packet integrity verification and member node
authentication.
Algorithm 3 Checking Actual Neighbors
Input: RREQ or RREP packet
Output: True if source node is actual neighbors; Else return False
1: function Boolean IsActualNeighbor(Packet P ; Key kNj+)
2: Begin
3: If Not IsPacketIntegrity(P, kNj+) Then return False;
4: GPS g = getGPS(); //Ni location
5: d← Distance(P.GPS, g);
6: Return (d 6Min(P.R,RNi));
7: End
The procedure for determining if a node is a true physical neighbor of another node is
shown in Algorithm 3. In order to calculate the distance between the two nodes, Nj saves the
location information and maximum radio range into GPS and R fields of the packet before
sending (or forwarding) the packet. At node Ni, after receiving the packet from node Nj , it
checks if the distance between itself and Nj is less than (or equal) the minimum of the radio
range (R) of the two nodes then Ni and Nj are verified true neighbors, otherwise, there is a
wormhole node on discovered route invisibly relaying the packet.
3.2. MLAMAN protocol – A secure AODV route discovery with Multi-Level
Authentication
As part of the MLAMAN model, we propose MLAMAN protocol, a secure and enhanced
AODV with built-in MLA mechanism for detecting and preventing wormhole attacks. Sim-
ilar to AODV, MLAMAN protocol includes two phases: a broadcasting route request phase
and an unicasting route reply phase. The control route packet structures of the new proto-
col (SecRREQ and SecRREP) extend the control packet structures of AODV (RREQ and
















Figure 2. The control route packet structures of MLAMAN protocol
3.2.1. Broadcasting route request packet phase
a) Generating SecRREQ packet: If the source node (NS) does not have a route to the
destination node, it initiates a new route discovery process by broadcasting the SecRREQ
packet to its neighbor nodes as in (4).
NSbroadcasts : SecRREQ← {RREQ∗ ⊕ 5NF} (4)
Where RREQ∗ is the original RREQ packet of the AODV routing protocol and 5NF is
the five new fields of the SecRREQ. These new fields contain the following information:
• SecRREQ.GPS = NS node GPS information;
• SecRREQ.R = 250 m;
• SecRREQ.MC = NS node MC;
• SecRREQ.KEY = Source node public key kNS+;
• SecRREQ.VC = Encryption of H(SecRREQ.fields \ {VC}) using kNS−;
b) Processing and forwarding SecRREQ packet: When a node receiving a SecRREQ
packet, the node (say Ni) drops this packet if it has not been certified, otherwise, it tests the
integrity of the packet, verifies the node membership of the sending node, and determines if
the sending node is a true neighbor according to the MLA mechanism.
• If the integrity SecRREQ packet is not verified, Ni drops the packet as the discovered
route has been tampered by a malicious node under PM mode.
• If the SecRREQ packet is not sent by a certified member node, Ni drops the SecRREQ
packet;
• If the SecRREQ packet is not sent by a true neighbor node, Ni drops the SecRREQ
packet as the discovered route has been interfered by a malicious node under HM mode.
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If all the conditions are satisfied, and the current node is the destination, it generates
and sends back the SecRREP packet; otherwise, it updates a reverse route toward the source
node and the 5NF of the SecRREQ packet with the latest information before broadcasting
the updated SecRREQ packet to its neighbors. Figure 3 describes the MLAMAN route
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Figure 3. MLAMAN route request algorithm
3.2.2. Unicasting route reply phase
a) Generating SecRREP packet: Figure 4 describes route reply packet algorithm using
the MLA mechanism. A node generates a SecRREP packet if it is either the destination
(ND) or an intermediate (Ni) which has a “fresh” route to the destination as in (5).
ND(orNi)unicasts : SecRREP ← {RREP ∗ ⊕ 5NF} (5)
Where RREP ∗ is the original RREP packet of the AODV routing protocol and 5NF is
five new fields of the SecRREP. These new fields contain the following information:
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• SecRREP.GPS = ND (or Ni) node GPS information;
• SecRREP.R = 250 m;
• SecRREP.MC = ND (or Ni) node MC;
• SecRREP.KEY = Public key kND+(or kNi+);


































better than existing route
destination or updates if





















Drops SecRREP Sends data packets from queue
yesnot found
Generates and setups 5NF for SecRREP




Figure 4. MLAMAN route reply algorithm
b) Processing and forwarding SecRREP packet: When a node receives a SecRREP packet,
the node drops the packet if it has not been certified, otherwise, it tests the integrity of the
packet, verifies the node membership of the sending node, and determines if the sending
node is a true neighbor according to the MLA mechanism.
• If the integrity SecRREP packet is not verified, Nj drops the packet as the discovered
route has been tampered by a malicious node under PM mode.
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• If the SecRREP packet is not sent by a certified member node, Nj drops the SecRREQ
packet;
• If the SecRREP packet is not sent by a true neighbor node, Nj drops the SecRREQ
packet as the discovered route has been interfered by a malicious node under HM mode.
If all the conditions are satisfied, and the current node is the source node, it will send
data packets to the destination node through the discovered route; otherwise, it updates a
reverse route to the destination node and the 5NF of the SecRREP packet with the lastest
information before sending the packet to the next hop the source node.
3.3. MLAMAN auxiliary protocol and procedure for providing node member-
ship certificate
In a MLAMAN ad hoc network, any node can verify the certification of another node
and only certified nodes can participate in the route discovery process. Figure 5 shows the
procedure for providing the MC to member nodes. The MLAMAN administrator possesses
a database of public keys (the PKDB) of all possible nodes that can join the ad hoc envi-
ronment. Any node in the PKDB can be designated as the Ncenter node. Some nodes in
the PKDB may have already had their membership certified by the Ncenter and some are
yet to be certified. Periodically after TMC time interval, Ncenter checks the PKDB to see
if all members have been provided with a membership certificate (MC). If node (Nδ) is not
yet provided with an MC, Ncenter broadcasts a membership certificate packet (MCP) to for
the destination Nδ. On receiving the MCP, node Nδ sends an MCACK packet back to the
Ncenter to confirm that it receives the MC. The procedure requires a PKDB and an auxiliary
protocol for granting certificates to members of PKDB.
When receiving packet MCACK , Ncenter checks: If the packet is sent by Nδ,
issuance of MC for Nδ is updated to PKDB, else this process is fail.
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MCACK
saved to its cache; Nδ sends unicast the packet MCACK to acknowledge for Ncenter.
the packet is therefore dropped. On the contrary, MC is created and
When receiving MCP packet, node Nδ checks: If packet MCP is not sent by Ncenter,
3
MCP
After a period of time TMC : If Nδ has not been certified with MC, Ncenter
provides MC for Nδ by broadcasting MCP packet.
2




Figure 5. The process provides MC for member nodes
3.3.1. The Public Key Database
The administrator sets up a reliable node named Ncenter to provide MC for members.
In Ncenter, a public key database (PKDB) of all nodes is created with the structure shown
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in Table 2. Each record in the PKDB consists of: node address (Nodes), node public key
(Key+), and node MC status. Where, two Nodes and Key+ attributes are updated directly
by administrators to ensure that only legitimate nodes are provided with MC.







3.3.2. MLAMAN membership certification protocol
a) Broadcasting MCP packet and saving MC
Ncenter provides MC for a member node Nδ by broadcasting a MCP packet. This protocol
is again an enhanced protocol of AODV for broadcasting the RREQ packet. The structure
of the MCP packet is similar to that of the RREQ packet and includes two new fields (2NF):










Figure 6. The control packet structures of membership certification protocol
Generating MCP packet: Periodically after TMC time interval, Ncenter checks to see if all
node members are provided with an MC by broadcasting the MCP packet to all its neighbors
as in (6).
Ncenterbroadcasts : MCP ← {RREQ∗ ⊕ 2NF} (6)
Where RREQ∗ is the original RREQ packet of the AODV routing protocol and 2NF is
two new fields of the MCP packet. The new fields contain the following information: the
CER field as calculated by (7) and the packet integrity VC field.
MCP.CER = En(En(H(IPNδ , kNδ+), kNcenter−), kNδ+) (7)
Processing and forwarding MCP packet: When a node receives a MCP packet, it tests
the integrity of the packet. If all the conditions are satisfied, and receiving node is the
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destination, it just simply saves the MC into cache and sends an MCACK packet back to
the Ncenter; otherwise, it updates a reverse route toward the source node and broadcasts the
MCP packet to its neighbors. Algorithm 4 shows the procedure for testing and saving the
Member Certification at a Nδ node. When Nδ receives the MCP packet, it tests the integrity
of the packet and whether the MCP is sent by the Ncenter node. If all the conditions are
satisfied, Nδ saves the MC in its cache and unicasts the MCACK packet to confirm its certified
status to the Ncenter; otherwise, the packet is dropped.
Algorithm 4 Testing and saving Member Certification
Input: MCP packet; Output: True if MCP is valid; Else return False
1: function Boolean TestAndSaveMC(Packet P)
2: Begin
3: If Not IsPacketIntegrity(P, kNcenter+) Then Dispose(P) and Return False;
4: val1← De(P.CER, kNδ−); //Now val1 equal En(H(IPNδ , kNδ+), kNcenter−);
5: val2← De(val1, kNcenter+);
6: If val2 6= H(IPNδ , kNδ+) Then Dispose(P) and Return False;
7: Else
8: MC ← En(val1, kNδ−); //Now MC value as formula 2
9: SaveToCache(MC);
10: Generating and Replying the MCACK packet back to Ncenter;
11: Return True;
12: End
b) Replying the MCACK packet
A certified member node Nδ is required to send a MCACK packet back to confirm its
status to the Ncenter. The procedure is similar to the procedure for unicasting the RREP
packet of the AODV. The structure of MCACK packet is similar as RREP packet and includes
three new fields (3NF): ACK, KEY and VC. The ACK field is calculated by (9), the KEY
value is the public key of Nδ and VC field is the packet integrity.
Generating MCACK packet: After saving the MC successfully, the node Nδ unicasts the
confirmation packet MCACK to back to the Ncenter as in (8).
Nδunicasts : MCACK ← {RREP ∗ ⊕ 3NF} (8)
Where RREP ∗ is the original RREP packet of AODV routing protocol and extended
with the three new fields as described in Figure 6(b).
MCACK .ACK ← En(En(H(IPNcenter), kNδ−), kNcenter+) (9)
Processing and forwarding MCACK packet: When a node receives a MCACK packet, it
tests the packet integrity. If all the conditions are satisfied and the receiving node is the
source, the node just simply updates the successfully provided MC to the Ncenter; otherwise,
the packet is dropped. Algorithm 5 shows the steps for testing and saving the acknowledge-
ment at the Ncenter node. When the Ncenter receives an MCACK packet, it tests the integrity
of the packet and whether the MCACK is sent by the Nδ node. If all the conditions are
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satisfied, the Ncenter updates the confirm status of the node in the PKDB; otherwise, the
packet is dropped.
Algorithm 5 Testing MCACK packet and updating PKDB
Input: MCACK packet; Output: True if MC is saved successful; Else return False
1: function Boolean TestMCACK(Packet P)
2: Begin
3: //P.KEY is kNδ+
4: If Not IsPacketIntegrity(P, P.KEY) Then Dispose(P) and Return False;
5: val1← De(P.ACK, kNcenter−); //Now val1 equal En(H(IPcenter), kNδ−);
6: val2← De(val1, P.KEY );
7: If val2 6= H(IPNcenter) Then Dispose(P) and Return False;
8: If (IPNδ exists in PKDB) Then
9: PKDB.Rows[IPNδ ].Completed ← Yes;
10: Return True;
11: Else
12: Dispose(P) and Return False;
13: End
4. MLAMAN Simulation Results and Performance Analysis
Using NS2 version 2.35, we simulate MLAMAN and evaluate its performance. The
simulation area was a 2000 m X 2000 m square region, large enough to accommodate an ad
hoc network with multiple hops. The simulation time was set at 1000 seconds, long enough
for the simulated network to settle down beyond its initial and transitional state.100 normal
and 2 malicious nodes were generated for the simulation and 802.11 was used for wireless
transmission. A source node sent out constant bit rate (CBR) traffic with packet sizes of
512bytes at a rate of 2 packets per second. FIFO was used for packet queueing. Table 3
tabulates relevant simulation parameters.
Table 3. Simulation parameters
Parameters Setting
Simulation area 2000 x 2000 (m2)
Simulation times 1000 (s)
Number nodes 102 (2 malicious nodes)
Maximum radio range (R) 250 (m)
Traffic type CBR
Transport protocol UDP
Data rate 2 packets per seconds
Packet size 512 bytes
Queue type FIFO (DropTail)
Routing protocols AODV and MLAMAN
Hash function (H) SHA1
Prime (p, q) 29, 31
TMC 10 (seconds)
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4.1. Wormhole Detection Performance
We evaluate the wormhole detection performance of the proposed MLAMAN based on
tunnel length and mobility speed metrics. Wormhole detection ratio (WDR) is defined as
eqn 10.
WDR = (1− FalsePositive+NegativesInstances
TotalSevRREQ+ SecRREP
) ∗ 100% (10)
There are 32 scenarios are simulated, each involves 100 normal mobile nodes and 2
malicious nodes. Nodes move in a Random Way Point [26] pattern with a specified maximum
speed (MS). Maximum speeds are set at 0, 10, 20 and 30 m/s. 40 pairs of communicating
nodes are set up with the source nodes in blue and destination nodes in red. Sources send
data at 5 seconds apart from one another, with the first at time zero. Two malicious nodes
are positioned near the center of the network with TL (tunnel length) hops between them.
TL is set at 1, 2, 3, and 4 hops for various simulations. The hop distance is set at 250m for
the network topology shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Network topology simulation, 40UDPs connections and Wormhole nodes using
4hops tunnel length
Simulation results in Figure 8 show that MLAMAN has a 100% the successful detection
rate in detecting invalid control route packets for static, stationary network topology where
nodes do not move, and over 99.9% detection rate for all mobile scenarios. Under the PM
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mode during the route discover process, wormhole nodes process control packets just like
other normal nodes, MLAMAN detects invalid control route packets (SecRREQs or SecR-
REPs forwarded by wormhole nodes) by verifying the integrity of these packets using the
packet integrity authentication algorithm. Under the HM mode, malicious nodes, on receiv-
ing the control packets, simply forwards them to others without processing packet, hence,
packet integrity verification and node membership authentication are no longer useful. In
this case, MLAMAN detects wormhole node by performing the actual neighbor authentica-
tion algorithm at the receiving node to determine if the received SecRREQ (or SecRREP)
packet is forwarded by a wormhole node. The weakness of MLA is the actual neighbors
authentication using node location to detect malicious node, thus, it can be mistaken in
mobility network topology at high speeds.
Figure 8. Wormhole detection performance for MLAMAN based on Tunnel Length and
Mobility Speed metrics, 40UDPs connections
In this section, we simulate MANETs under different traffic conditions and tunnel lengths
and evaluate MLAMAN’s performance. Same as before, 32 scenarios are simulated, each has
100 normal mobile nodes and 2 malicious nodes and all of nodes move randomly with a
maximum speed of 20 m/s. Traffic conditions range from light to heavy and are represented
by the number of UDP network connections (NCs) between source-destination node pairs
from 10 for light traffic to 40 for heavy traffic. Other parameters remain the same as described
in Table 3. Simulation results in Figure 9 show that MLA has PM wormhole node detection
effectuation is better than HM wormhole node. The successful detection ratio over 98.03%
of wormhole nodes using both of HM and PM modes for all simulation scenarios. With
TTHCA, the detection performance is excellent for long tunnels, but it degrades to less than
90% [12] when the tunnel length is less than 5 due to the difficulty in measuring short the
packet transversal times. This fact also implies that TTHCA may not perform well when
nodes are moving at various speeds. The detection results in simulation results in Figure 8
and Figure 9 confirm that MLA outperformed TTHCA and other methods [9][12] for short
tunnel length and high mobility speed simulation scenarios.
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Figure 9. Wormhole detection performance for MLAMAN based on Number UDP connection
and Tunnel Length metric, 20m/s mobility speeds maximum
4.2. Packet overhead and Packet delivery ratio
In this section we analyze the packet overhead (PO) for providing the node membership
certification and the packet delivery ratio (PDR) in a normal network topology as shown in
eqn 11 and 12.
PO = Total of MCP +MCACK (11)
PDR = (
Number of packets delivered successfully
Total of packtes are sent from source
) ∗ 100% (12)
Four specific scenarios are simulated, has all of them assume 20 pairs of communicating
nodes with the first source node sending data at time zero and the rest sending data at
5-second intervals.
The first scenario simulates AODV protocol for 100-node MANET. The second scenario
simulates MLAMAN for 100-node MANET and used with 100 member nodes in the PKDB
database;
The third scenario simulates MLAMAN for100-node MANET with 80 member nodes
from 0 to 79 identified in PKDB;
The fourth scenario simulates MLAMAN for 100-node MANET with 80 member nodes
from 0 to 79 identified in PKDB and 20 new member nodes are installed into PKDB at 200th
seconds.
Figure 10 shows that MLAMAN requires 80 seconds and an overhead of 19,645 of packets
(CMP and MCACK) to provide MC for all 100 member nodes listed in the PKBD database.
The overheads are 70 seconds and 18,056 packets for 80 member nodes. For the fourth
scenario, total packet overhead of MLAMAN is 20,412 packets and 230 seconds for completing
the member certification process.
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Figure 10. Packet overhead of MLAMAN protocol to provide MC for member nodes
Figure 11 shows that the packet delivery ratio of AODV is better than MLAMAN with all
member nodes listed in the PKBD. With MLAMAN, most of the nodes cannot participate
in the route discover process at the early stage of the operation as they have not yet been
certified and hence packets cannot be delivered to their destination. As time progresses, more
and more nodes are certified resulting in higher number of successful packet delivery. The
MC process completes after 80 seconds providing all listed member nodes are operational.
At the end of the simulation, the PDR for MLAMAN is 59.13% compared to 72.94% for the
AODV for this scenario. With the scenario where 80 member nodes are installed in PKBD,
PDR of MLAMAN is reduced to 23.89% due to the fact that around 50% of the destination
nodes was not in PKDB. Final scenario, PDR for MLAMAN is improved to 52.1% eventually
as 20 new member nodes are added into PKDB at time 200s.
Figure 11. Comparison of packet delivery ratio of AODV and MLAMAN protocols in normal
network topology
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4.3. Route Discovery Time
To evaluate the route discovery time of MLAMAN compared to the original AODV
protocol. MLAMAN requires every mobile nodes, on a hop-by-hop basis, to test the integrity
of the control packets SecRREQ and SecRREP, verify the membership of the sending nodes
as well as their neighborhood status for wormhole detection, it is expected that the route
discovery time of MLAMAN be higher than that of AODV. The simulation results in Figure
12 are based on the average route discovery delay for scenario using 100 normal mobile nodes.
It is clear that when the network traffic increases the route discovery time increases.
Figure 12. Route discovery delay of AODV and MLAMAN protocols in normal network
topology
5. Conclusions and Future Works
We proposed MLAMAN, a novel model that deployed multi-level authentication and
routing protocol to prevent wormhole attacks in MANETs. MLAMAN verifies the integrity
and the authenticity of a routing control packet on a hop-by-hop basis. It also utilizes
positioning information of the sending and receiving nodes to judge their neighborhood re-
lationship. Simulation results demonstrated that the MLAMAN was very robust against
wormhole attacks. For a static network topology, it was 100% successful in detecting worm-
hole attacks. For a dynamic and mobile topology where a minimum tunnel length of 1 hop
and with a maximum node moving speed of 30 m/s it achieves a successful wormhole detec-
tion rate of over 95.98% in both Hidden and Participation Modes. To support MLAMAN,
a management protocol was introduced to provide node membership certification to prevent
malicious nodes from joining the network with the fake keys.
Our next step is to setup MLAMAN with large key to improve the security performance
using TLS library [17] and evaluate the security capability of MLAMAN through comprehen-
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